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SELF-INCRJMINATION, COMPULSION, AND THE UNDER-
COVER AGENT-Illinois v. Perkins, 110 S. Ct. 2394 (1990).
Abstract: As a rule, police officers must advise suspects held in custody of their rights
before interrogating them. In Illinois v. Perkins, the Supreme Court created an undercover
agent exception to this rule. The Perkins Court concluded that the rule does not apply
because undercover interrogations do not compel criminal defendants to incriminate
themselves. This Note examines the impact of the Perkins exception and concludes that
the rule should apply even when undercover agents conduct the inherently compelling
custodial interrogation.
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution provides
that "[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself."' In Miranda v. Arizona,I the Warren Court
concluded that suspects are unconstitutionally compelled to incrimi-
nate themselves if they are interrogated while in custody without first
being advised of their rights.3 Whether this definition of compulsion
applies when a suspect is secretly interrogated by undercover agents
while in custody was recently addressed in Illinois v. Perkins.4 The
Supreme Court held that surreptitious interrogations do not inherently
compel suspects to incriminate themselves.5 Thus, undercover agents
are not required to inform incarcerated suspects of their rights before
interrogation.6 This Note analyzes the Court's holding in Perkins and
concludes that Miranda should apply to covert custodial
interrogations.
I. THE MIRANDA DOCTRINE: PROTECTING CRIMINAL
DEFENDANTS FROM COMPELLED SELF-
INCRIMINATION
In Miranda v. Arizona,7 the Supreme Court established a per se rule
requiring that suspects be advised of their rights prior to "custodial
interrogation."8 Custodial interrogation consists of "questioning initi-
ated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his [or her] freedom of action." 9 The
Miranda Court held that custodial interrogations inherently compel
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3. Id. at 444.
4. 110 S. Ct. 2394 (1990).
5. Id. at 2397.
6. Id. at 2399.
7. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
8. Id. at 444.
9. Id.
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individuals to incriminate themselves."° Without adequate procedural
safeguards, custodial interrogations violate the fifth amendment."
The procedural safeguards required by Miranda include warnings to
suspects that they have the right to remain silent, that anything they
say may be used against them, and that they have the right to consult
with an attorney. 2 The Miranda Court also established a fifth amend-
ment right to counsel, 3 concluding that the presence of counsel dur-
ing questioning reduces the likelihood that police will coerce the
suspect into confessing. t4
The objective of the Miranda Court was to provide "concrete con-
stitutional guidelines" for enforcement officials and lower courts to
follow. 5 Problems with the previous methods of determining whether
confessions could be used as evidence created a need for clear rules.
Prior to Miranda, courts employed two approaches: the common law
coerced confession standard and the due process or "voluntariness"
test. t6 The common law approach involved examining a confession's
reliability. Confessions were unreliable and usually inadmissible if
induced by actual or threatened physical harm, promises not to prose-
cute, promises to provide lenient sentencing, or "deceptive practices so
extreme that they might have produced a false confession."' 7 The
common law coerced confession doctrine was expanded in the late
10. Id. at 467 ("IT]he process of incustody [sic] interrogation . . . contains inherently
compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual's will to resist and to compel him
to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely.").
11. Id. at 458.
12. Id. at 444, 467 ("In order to combat these pressures and to permit a full opportunity to
exercise the privilege against self-incrimination, the accused must be adequately and effectively
apprised of his rights and the exercise of those rights must be fully honored.").
13. Id. at 470 ("[T]he need for counsel to protect the [f]ifth [a]mendment privilege
comprehends not merely a right to consult with counsel prior to questioning, but also to have
counsel present during any questioning if the defendant so desires."); see also Minnick v.
Mississippi, 111 S. Ct. 486, 491 (1990) ("[W]hen counsel is requested, interrogation must cease,
and officials may not reinitiate interrogation without counsel present, whether or not the accused
has consulted with his attorney.").
The fifth amendment right to counsel differs from the right guaranteed by the sixth
amendment. See U.S. CONsT. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall ...
have the assistance of counsel for his defence."). The sixth amendment right attaches when an
indictment is filed. See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 205 (1964); see also FED. R.
CRIM. P. 7(a) (in noncapital cases, an information may be substituted for an indictment). Absent
a valid waiver of the right to counsel, the government may not directly or covertly interrogate an
indicted defendant about the crimes charged unless the defendant's attorney is present. Massiah,
377 U.S. at 206; see Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159 (1985).
14. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 470.
15. Id. at 442.
16. See generally 1 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 439-51 (1984).
17. Id. at 440.
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1800s and was transformed into the due process standard."8 Under
the due process approach, courts considered the "totality of the cir-
cumstances" surrounding a confession and barred those confessions
that were of doubtful reliability, obtained through offensive police
practices, or produced by a defendant whose free choice was signifi-
cantly impaired.19
The case-by-case approach required by the coerced confession and
due process standards presented substantial problems. First, these
standards required fact-intensive, laborious inquiries into the circum-
stances surrounding each confession.2" Second, the admissibility of a
confession ultimately rested on the competing credibilities of the
defendant and the interrogating officer.2" The ensuing "swearing con-
tests" were susceptible to systematic resolution in favor of the police.22
Third, the case-by-case approach inhibited the Supreme Court from
establishing broad, unambiguous guidelines.23  The Court had little
opportunity to influence the behavior of enforcement officials and
lower courts because it reviewed so few confession cases each year,
and the holding in each case it reviewed was limited to its facts.24
Lacking adequate guidance, police continued to employ, and lower
courts continued to uphold, improper and abusive tactics.25
The Miranda Court abandoned the ineffective case-by-case
approach and adopted "bright line" rules designed to clearly distin-
guish admissible from inadmissible confessions.26 First, enforcement
18. Id. at 441.
19. Id. at 444.
20. Ogletree, Are Confessions Really Good for the Soul?: A Proposal to Mirandize Miranda,
100 HARV. L. REv. 1826, 1832-33 (1987).
21. W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 16, at 451.
22. Schulhofer, Confessions and the Court, 79 MICH. L. REV. 865, 871 (1981).
23. W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 16, at 450.
24. Id.; Ogletree, supra note 20, at 1834; see also Schulhofer, supra note 22, at 869 ("[Vlery
few confessions issues won Supreme Court consideration in noncapital cases, and even in capital
cases only one out of four petitioners was granted a hearing .... ").
25. W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 16, at 450; see Ogletree, supra note 20, at 1833
("[T]he outrageous conduct in Brown may have led courts inadvertently to view other cases of
compelled confessions as moderate by comparison." (referring to Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S.
278 (1936), in which the confessions were procured by whipping and hanging the defendants)).
26. Commentators continue to debate whether Miranda adequately separates valid from
invalid confessions. Cf Ogletree, supra note 20, at 1830 ("[T]he Miranda rules do not go far
enough in protecting the due process and fifth amendment values that underlie the decision.");
Rosenberg & Rosenberg, A Modest Proposal for the Abolition of Custodial Confessions, 68 N.C.L.
REv. 69, 74 (1989) ("Miranda has been so diluted that its main value today may be merely
symbolic."); id. at 82 ("[Tlhe Justices have diluted Miranda ... by allowing statements obtained
in violation of Miranda to be used . . . for impeachment; by making the requirements for
invocation of Miranda rights stricter and the requirements for waiver more lenient; [and] by
interpreting terms such as custody [and] interrogation.., in a narrow manner ... ").
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officials must apprise suspects held in custody of their rights before
interrogating them.27 Second, interrogation must cease if the suspect
invokes either the right to remain silent or the right to counsel.2" A
suspect, however, may waive either right.2 9 Finally, if interrogation
proceeds despite the suspect's requests, courts must presume that the
suspect's subsequent statements were compelled.3 °
A defendant may move to exclude from evidence incriminating
statements obtained through compulsion.3" The statements may be
suppressed on either due process or Miranda grounds.32 To exclude
statements because police failed to adhere to Miranda's requirements,
the defendant must show that police obtained the statements during
custodial interrogation.33 After Miranda, the Supreme Court further
defined the custody and interrogation requirements for excluding the
defendant's statements on Miranda grounds.
A. Custody: Presence, Not Purpose
Custody generally refers to the deprivation of a person's freedom of
action by government authorities.34 In most cases, the suspect's pres-
27. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
28. Id. at 473-74. "Without the right to cut off questioning ... in-custody interrogation
operates on the individual to overcome free choice . I..." d  at 474.
29. Id. at 444. The government bears a "heavy burden" of demonstrating that the suspect
"voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently" relinquished his or her rights. Id. at 444, 475; W.
LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 16, at 524-25. The waiver issue is not relevant to Illinois v.
Perkins, 110 S. Ct. 2394 (1990), because the defendant in that case did not receive Miranda
warnings. Absent Miranda warnings, courts must presume that the suspect did not know his or
her rights and thus, could not validly waive them. 384 U.S. at 468-69.
30. 384 U.S. at 474 ("[A]ny statement taken after the person invokes his [fifth amendment]
privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise."); see State v.
Travis, 116 R.I. 678, 360 A.2d 548 (1976) (holding inadmissible an incarcerated defendant's
statements to an undercover agent posing as a fellow inmate because the defendant had
previously invoked the right to remain silent and consult with an attorney); see also State v.
McMullan, 713 S.W.2d 881 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (suppressing statements obtained by an
informant purposely incarcerated with a defendant who had earlier requested an attorney).
31. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 114-11(a) (Smith-Hurd 1977) ("Prior to the trial
of any criminal case a defendant may move to suppress as evidence any confession given by him
on the ground that it was not voluntary."). Perkins arose in Illinois. See also UNIF. R. CRIM. P.
461(a) ("[Tlhe court shall suppress ... testimony or other evidence if. . . required under the
Constitution of the United States .... "); FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(3) (motions to suppress
evidence must be raised prior to trial).
32. Miranda supplemented, but did not supplant, the pre-existing means of evaluating the
admissibility of confessions. If applicable, the defendant may invoke the due process doctrine.
See W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 16, at 448.
33. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444; W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 16, at 481.
34. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. See generally W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 16, at
489-99.
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ence at a police station or jail constitutes custody. a5 If detained or
incarcerated on one charge, the suspect is in custody even when inter-
rogated about unrelated offenses.3 6 The purpose of the suspect's cus-
tody is not relevant to whether Miranda applies.3 7
B. Interrogation: Actions Likely to Elicit a Response
In Rhode Island v. Innis,3" the Court defined interrogation as
"either express questioning or its functional equivalent."'39 The func-
tional equivalent of express questioning includes any words or actions
the police should know are "reasonably likely to elicit an incriminat-
ing response."'  State courts have used the Innis test to suppress
incriminating statements obtained from incarcerated suspects by
undercover officers or informants.41 These courts have concluded that
35. W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 16, at 494-95. The Supreme Court has broadened
the definition of custody to include interrogations during which the suspect was not at a police
station. See Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969) (defendant was in custody when four police
officers interrogated him in his bedroom because the officers intended the defendant to be under
arrest and not free to leave). But see Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976) (suspect was
not in custody when questioned at a private residence because the familiar surroundings did not
constitute a coercive environment).
36. Eg., Holyfield v. State, 101 Nev. 793, 711 P.2d 834 (1985) (holding that a defendant, in
jail for the robbery of a movie theater, was in custody when a government informant with whom
he was incarcerated questioned him about the unrelated armed robbery of a credit union); see
also W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 16, at 491.
37. Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1968). In Mathis, an Internal Revenue Service
agent questioned the defendant without advising him of his Miranda rights. Id. at 2-3. At the
time of questioning, the defendant was in prison for an unrelated state offense. Id. at 2. The
Supreme Court overturned the defendant's conviction for tax fraud on the grounds that he was in
custody and should have received Miranda warnings. Id. at 2, 5.
38. 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
39. Id. at 300-01.
40. Id. at 301. In Innis, the defendant surrendered a suspected murder weapon after police
officers expressed concern that children might discover the weapon and injure themselves. Id. at
294-95. The Innis Court concluded that the officers did not interrogate' the defendant because
the officers had no reason to know that their actions would elicit an incriminating response. Id.
at 303. The Court assumed the defendant was "peculiarly susceptible" to appeals concerning the
safety of children in the area. Id. at 302.
Justice Stevens disagreed with the Innis majority's standard for interrogation. According to
Justice Stevens, interrogation consists of "police conduct or statements that would appear to a
reasonable person... to call for a response." Id. at 311 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens
also observed that the defendant did not possess a peculiar susceptibility, but merely responded
as police manuals predicted. Id. at 315 ("[A]ppealing to a suspect's sense of morality [is] a
standard and often successful interrogation technique."). The officers knew the chances were
slim that children would find the weapon, id. at 316 n.19, and therefore, according to Justice
Stevens, they impermissibly elicited the defendant's inculpatory response. Id. at 316-17.
41. See Holyfield v. State, 101 Nev. 793, 711 P.2d 834 (1985). Before Innis, state courts
employed definitions of interrogation equivalent to the standard developed by the Innis Court.
See, eg., State v. Fuller, 204 Neb. 196, 281 N.W.2d 749 (1979); State v. Travis, 116 R.I. 678, 360
A.2d 548 (1976).
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undercover activity constitutes interrogation if designed to elicit
incriminating information.42
II. ILLINOIS V PERKINS: LIMITING MIRANDA'S SCOPE
Prior to Illinois v. Perkins,43 the Supreme Court had not addressed
whether Miranda warnings are required before undercover agents may
conduct jailhouse interrogations.' The Perkins case involved an
incarcerated defendant, Lloyd Perkins, who made incriminating state-
ments to a narcotics agent, John Parisi, and an informant, Donald
Charlton, without being advised of his rights.45 Based on these state-
ments, Perkins was charged with the 1984 murder of Richard
Stephenson.46
In 1986, while serving a sentence at the Graham Correctional Facil-
ity, Charlton contacted police with information about the Stephenson
murder.47 Charlton identified Perkins, previously a fellow inmate at
Graham, as a likely suspect.48 Charlton was subsequently released
from Graham specifically to telephone Perkins.49 Police planned to
monitor the conversation.50  Attempts to contact Perkins, however,
proved unsuccessful. 5' Police then discovered that Perkins was in the
Montgomery County Jail awaiting trial for an aggravated battery
42. Holyfield, 101 Nev. at 799-800, 711 P.2d at 838 ("[P]olice deliberately placed [an
informant] in Holyfield's cell . . . . [The] conversation with Holyfield was the functional
equivalent of express police questioning... under the [Innis] test ...."); Travis, 116 R.I. at 683,
360 A.2d at 551 ("The mere presence of [the undercover agent] was an inducement to speak
.... .).
43. 110 S. Ct. 2394 (1990).
44. See W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 16, at 512-13. The Court has, however,
interpreted the sixth amendment right to counsel as distinguishing between undercover agents
who passively receive incriminating information and agents who "deliberately elicit" an indicted
defendant's confession. Compare Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986) (jailhouse informant
merely listened to "spontaneous and unsolicited" statements and did not violate the defendant's
right to counsel) with Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) (federal agents abridged the
indicted defendant's sixth amendment rights by installing a transmitter in a co-defendant's
automobile and employing the co-defendant to elicit incriminating statements from the
defendant) and United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980) (by placing an informant in the
indicted defendant's jail cell, the government intentionally created a situation likely to elicit
incriminating statements and therefore violated the defendant's right to counsel).
45. 110 S. Ct. at 2396.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Proceedings at 7, People v. Perkins (I11. Cir. Ct., 20th Cir., Feb. 18, 1987) (No. 86-CF-
305) (Report of Proceedings on Motion to Suppress available in Joint Appendix, Illinois v.
Perkins, 110 S. Ct. 2394 (1990) (No. 88-1972)).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 8.
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charge unrelated to the Stephenson murder. 2 They decided to con-
tinue their investigation of Perkins using undercover techniques.
Parisi and Charlton, disguised as inmates, entered Perkins' cellblock
and involved him in a feigned plan to escape.53 While discussing the
possibility that they might have to kill people during the escape, Parisi
asked Perkins whether he had "ever done anybody."54 Perkins alleg-
edly responded by describing the Stephenson murder." The following
day, police charged Perkins with murder. 6 After receiving Miranda
warnings, Perkins immediately requested an attorney57 and did not
answer further questions.5 8
Before trial, defense counsel moved to suppress the statements Per-
kins made to Parisi and Charlton. 9 The trial court granted the
motion.6 The Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed the order, holding
that the defendant's statements were the product of a custodial inter-
rogation not preceded by Miranda warnings.61 The Illinois Supreme
Court denied leave to appeal.62
The United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding,
in an opinion by Justice Kennedy, that surreptitious custodial interro-
gations fall outside the scope of Miranda's protection.6" The Perkins
Court concluded that Miranda does not require undercover officers
posing as inmates to administer warnings to incarcerated suspects
prior to questioning. 4 The Court therefore held admissible as evi-
52. 110 S. Ct. at 2396.
53. Id.
54. Proceedings at 44.
55. 110 S. Ct. at 2396. Perkins did not testify at the hearing regarding the motion to
suppress. See Proceedings.
56. Proceedings at 15.
57. The record does not indicate whether Perkins requested or received counsel regarding the
aggravated battery charge for which he was awaiting trial. See infra note 70.
58. Proceedings at 15.
59. 110 S. Ct. at 2396.
60. People v. Perkins, No. 86-CF-305 (Ill. Cir. Crt., 20th Cir., April 8, 1987) (order
suppressing Perkins' statements to Parisi and Charlton), aff'd 176 Ill. App. 3d 443, 531 N.E.2d
141 (1988), cert denied 125 Ill. 2d 572, 537 N.E.2d 816 (1989), rev'd 110 S. Ct. 2394 (1990).
61. People v. Perkins, 176 Ill. App. 3d 443, 531 N.E.2d 141 (1988), cert denied 125 Ill. 2d
572, 537 N.E.2d 816 (1989), rev'd 110 S. Ct. 2394 (1990).
62. People v. Perkins, 125 Ill. 2d 572, 537 N.E.2d 816 (1989).
63. See Perkins, 110 S. Ct. at 2399.
64. Id. Justices Brennan and Marshall issued separate opinions. Justice Brennan concurred
in the judgment, but opined that the Illinois police's deceptive actions may constitute a due
process violation of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 2400-01 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[T]he
lower court on remand [may] determine whether.., respondent's confession was elicited in a
manner that violated the [d]ue [plrocess [c]lause."). Justice Marshall dissented, concluding that
compulsion may exist even when suspects do not know that their fellow inmates are government
611
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dence the statements Perkins made to Parisi and Charlton.65 The
Court observed that Perkins believed he was speaking with fellow
inmates.66 Viewed from the suspect's perspective, Perkins was not
coerced; 67  he voluntarily offered the incriminating information.
68
According to the Court, Miranda warnings were not required because
covert interrogations do not inherently amount to compulsion.69
III. MIRANDA SHOULD APPLY TO SURREPTITIOUS
CUSTODIAL INTERROGATIONS
Miranda's protections should have applied to Perkins because police
conducted a custodial interrogation.7" First, Perkins was in custody
because he was incarcerated on an unrelated charge at the time of
agents. Id. at 2403 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall objected to the majority's
adoption of an undercover exception to the Miranda rule. Id. at 2404.
65. See id. at 2399.
66. See id. at 2397-98.
67. See id. at 2397.
68. Id. at 2398. The Court compared the facts presented in Perkins with the facts of Hoffa v.
United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966). The Haffa Court held that the defendant voluntarily
conversed with a cohort who was secretly cooperating with police, and that he could not,
therefore, claim that his incriminating statements resulted from coercion. Id. at 304. Comparing
the two cases, the Perkins Court concluded that the only distinction was Perkins' incarceration at
the time of questioning. 110 S. Ct. at 2398. The Perkins Court rejected any presumption that the
use of undercover techniques rendered the defendant's statements involuntary. Id.
69. 110 S. Ct. at 2397. "Miranda forbids coercion, not mere strategic deception .... Ploys to
mislead a suspect or lull him into a false sense of security that do not rise to the level of
compulsion ... are not within Miranda's concerns." Id.
70. The Court did not dispute that Perkins was interrogated while in custody. Id. at 2401
(Marshall, J., dissenting); see also id. at 2399 n.** (Brennan, J., concurring) ("As the case comes
to us, it involves only the question whether Miranda applies. ... ). The Perkins Court
considered only whether Miranda applied because the fifth and sixth amendment right to counsel
issues were not presented on appeal. Although the fifth amendment right to counsel extends to
subsequent interrogations about unrelated offenses, the Supreme Court has yet to determine
whether a suspect has the right to have counsel present during surreptitious interrogations. Cf
Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988) (right to counsel prohibited an interrogation three
days later by a different officer about an unrelated offense); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477
(1981) (interrogation must adjourn following a request for counsel until either the suspect
initiates further conversation or counsel is provided). Even if Perkins had requested counsel
regarding the aggravated battery charge, the fifth amendment right to counsel would not
necessarily mandate exclusion of statements Perkins made to undercover agents about the
Stephenson murder. On the other hand, the sixth amendment right to counsel protects indicted
defendants from covert attempts to elicit incriminating information. United States v. Henry, 447
U.S. 264 (1980); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964). The sixth amendment right does
not, however, protect a defendant from questioning about an offense unrelated to the indictment.
Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 180 (1985); see also Perkins, 110 S. Ct. at 2399. Even if Perkins
had been formally charged with aggravated battery, he might not have had grounds to exclude
statements he made to undercover agents about the unrelated Stephenson murder.
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questioning.71 Second, under the Innis definition,72 Illinois police
interrogated Perkins by using an undercover ruse designed to elicit
incriminating statements.73  The police knew the escape ploy might
cause Perkins to reveal prior criminal exploits.74
Although police interrogated Perkins while he was in custody, the
Court denied Perkins the protections of Miranda. The Court con-
cluded that, regardless of Miranda's per se definition of compulsion,
Perkins was not compelled because coercion does not exist when
incarcerated suspects believe they are speaking with fellow inmates.75
The Court's conclusion, however, failed to recognize the central issue
in determining whether compulsion exists.
The central issue is the suspect's consent-consent to the presence
of companions and consent to speak to those companions. The issue
of consent is raised when companions actively initiate conversation
with the suspect. Whether the companions compelled the suspect to
choose speech over silence must be determined. On the other hand,
when companions passively listen to the suspect, the issue of coercion
71. Perkins is analogous to Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968) (discussed supra note
37). Officers cannot extinguish custody by asking suspects questions unrelated to the offense
leading to incarceration. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
72. See supra notes 39-40 (interrogation consists of either express questioning or actions that
might reasonably elicit an incriminating response). But see supra note 40 (in his dissent, Justice
Stevens defined interrogation to include any statement understood by the average listener as
calling for a response). Under the alternate definition offered by Justice Stevens, the police
interrogated Perkins because the average person would respond to an invitation to escape from
prison. The average response might indicate an unwillingness to participate in a jailbreak, but
such an indication still constitutes a response. Thus, the invitation to escape initiated an
interrogation. As Justice Stevens observed, the issue is not whether an interrogation successfully
elicits inculpatory information, but whether, without Miranda warnings, the interrogation
should occur at all. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 309 n.5 (1980) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
73. See Perkins, 110 S. Ct. at 2401-02 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 41-42
(state supreme courts that have examined facts similar to Perkins have concluded that
undercover questioning constitutes interrogation). But see Comment, Confusing the Fifth
Amendment with the Sixth: Lower Court Misapplication of the Innis Definition of Interrogation,
87 MICH. L. REv. 1073, 1117 (1989) ("A literal reading of the Innis test does require courts to
view jail plant tactics as interrogation.... But reading Innis literally is inappropriate when
analyzing a situation beyond the scope of the Innis Court's reasoning.").
74. Cf Proceedings at 10, People v. Perkins (Ill. Cir. Ct., 20th Cir., Feb. 18, 1987) (No. 86-
CF-305) (Report of Proceedings on Motion to Suppress available in Joint Appendix, Illinois v.
Perkins, 110 S. Ct. 2394 (1990) (No. 88-1972)) ("[I]t was decided that Mr. Parisi would stay in
[the cellblock] a max [sic] of three days or until a conversation took place ... regarding the
homicide." (emphasis added)). Illinois police considered a variety of alternative methods,
including electronic eavesdropping of the cellblock, but chose the undercover escape ploy
because it had the highest likelihood of success. Id. at 9-10.
75. See Perkins, 110 S. Ct. at 2397.
Washington Law Review
is not presented. Consent is presumed when the suspect makes unso-
licited statements.76
The Perkins Court relied on Hoffa v. United States77 to support its
conclusion that Perkins was not compelled. Hoffa, however, does not
provide adequate precedent for the Perkins decision for three reasons.
First, the Hoffa Court emphasized the defendant's consent to the
informant's presence. The Hoffa Court labeled the conversation
between the defendant and the informant voluntary because Hoffa had
the power to exclude the informant, but permitted the informant to
enter his private hotel suite and remain his constant companion. 8
Second, in Hoffa, federal agents merely asked the informant to be alert
to the defendants' actions.79 Third, Hoffa could not claim Miranda's
protection because he was not in custody when he made his incrimi-
nating statements.8 0
Perkins can be distinguished from Hoffa on all three counts. Unlike
Hoffa, Perkins was in custody when he was covertly interrogated and
thus could not consent to the presence of government agents. Perkins
had no control over the choice of cellmates. He could neither leave
nor demand that the "fellow inmates" leave the confines of the cell-
block. Although Perkins had no control over the presence of the
agents, he had control over whether he would speak to them. The
government agents in Perkins, however, were not merely passive lis-
teners; Parisi and Charlton posed direct questions to Perkins8 ' and
offered him a reward for speaking. 2 Whether Perkins consented to
speak cannot be determined from his eventual self-incrimination. 3
76. Cf Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986) (discussed supra note 44).
77. 385 U.S. 293 (1966) (discussed supra note 68).
78. Id. at 296, 304.
79. Id. at 298. Because Hoffa's statements were unsolicited, Hoffa's consent to speak is
presumed. See supra text accompanying note 76.
80. See Illinois v. Perkins, 110 S. Ct. 2394, 2402 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also
Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 294-96 (Hoffa made incriminating statements about his plans to bribe jury
members in the privacy of his hotel suite). The Hoffa Court could have, but did not, render its
decision on the narrow basis that Hoffa was not in custody and therefore not entitled to receive
Miranda warnings.
81. See Proceedings at 44, People v. Perkins (Ill. Cir. Ct., 20th Cir., Feb. 18, 1987) (No. 86-
CF-305) (Report of Proceedings on Motion to Suppress available in Joint Appendix, Illinois v.
Perkins, 110 S. Ct. 2394 (1990) (No. 88-1972)) (Parisi asked Perkins whether he had ever killed
anyone). The questioning would clearly be considered interrogation if Parisi and Charlton had
identified themselves as government agents. Cf Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01
(1980) (express questioning constitutes interrogation).
82. See infra text accompanying notes 108-09.
83. Cf Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966) ("[A] valid waiver will not be presumed
... simply from the fact that a confession was in fact eventually obtained.").
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Coercion may elicit information from an individual who would not
otherwise voluntarily speak. 4
The Perkins Court concentrated exclusively on the defendant's pre-
sumed consent to speak and ignored the consent to presence issue.
The admissibility of Hoffa's incriminating statements, however, turned
on whether Hoffa consented to the informant's presence, 5 and Hoffa's
consent to speak was a peripheral issue. The same should be true of
Perkins. 6 Perkins did not consent to the presence of undercover
agents, and his statements should therefore be excluded. 7
Although the Court minimizes the relevance of Perkins' incarcera-
tion,88 custody contributes significantly to the coercion inherent in
Perkins. 89 Custody grants the police control over a suspect's environ-
ment. The anxiety caused by confinement often leads suspects to seek
comfort and relief by speaking with those nearby.90 By controlling the
assignment of celimates, the police can virtually guarantee that the
person in whom the suspect confides will be an undercover agent. 9
Undercover questioning undermines the suspect's natural defenses.
A suspect confronted by police officers is likely to be reticent after
receiving Miranda warnings. 92 Police employ undercover techniques
because suspects will more likely speak candidly with agents posing as
84. Cf Dripps, Against Police Interrogation - And the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 78
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 699, 700 (1988) ("[T]he bulk of confessions results from
irrationality, mistake, and manipulation. Any expectation that truly voluntary confessions are
available on a systemic basis depends... on unsupportable factual assumptions .... ").
85. Cf Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (suspect's consent justified
warrantless search); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961) (fourth amendment protects
conversations from unreasonable searches and seizures).
86. But custody distinguishes Perkins from Hoffa on fourth amendment grounds. Hudson v.
Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984) (fourth amendment does not apply to prison cells).
87. Exclusion of Perkins' statements to undercover agents because he did not consent to their
presence would not impact the admissibility of statements an incarcerated suspect might make to
an actual fellow inmate. Although the suspect would not have consented to the presence of the
fellow inmate, a fellow inmate who has not made prior arrangements to cooperate with police is
not a government agent, and therefore is not bound by the fifth amendment. Cf. L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONsTrrUTIONAL LAW 1688 (2d ed. 1988) ("Nearly all of the Constitution's
guarantees of individual rights shield individuals only from government action.... [C]ourts
must first determine whether it is indeed government action . . . that the litigants are
challenging.").
88. See Illinois v. Perkins, 110 S. Ct. 2394, 2398 (1990) ("The only difference between this
case and Hoffa is that the suspect here was incarcerated.
89. "[T]he pressures unique to custody allow the police to use deceptive interrogation tactics
to compel a suspect to make an incriminating statement. The compulsion is not eliminated by
the suspect's ignorance of his interrogator's true identity." Id at 2403 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
90. White, Police Trickery in Inducing Confessions, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 581, 604-05 (1979).
91. Id. at 605.
92. United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 273 (1980) ("An accused speaking to a known
Government agent is typically aware that his statements may be used against him.... [A] fellow
615
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fellow inmates or compatriots in crime.93 Unlike actual inmates, how-
ever, undercover officers trained in psychological techniques can
manipulate a suspect into confessing. 94 Thus, contrary to the conclu-
sions of the Perkins Court, surreptitious techniques that are coupled
with the power to choose the persons with whom the suspect interacts
create the compulsion inherent in ordinary custodial interrogations
and heighten the need for Miranda warnings.
IV. THE RAMIFICATIONS OF PERKINS
A. Perkins Creates an Exception to Miranda
Perkins carves out an exception to the Miranda doctrine. 95
Although the exception appears narrowly suited to the facts of Per-
kins,96 the exception has broad ramifications because it permits police
to ignore Miranda's mandate. If police can validly obtain a confession
using undercover agents, then police have no incentive to interrogate
the suspect using uniformed officers. Thus, Perkins encourages police
to revert to surreptitious methods of obtaining a confession before
even attempting to interrogate the suspect directly. If police do not
conduct an overt custodial interrogation they are not required to
administer Miranda warnings.97 In addition, even if police advise a
inmate who is acting by prearrangement as a Government agent ... may elicit information that
an accused would not intentionally reveal to persons known to be Government agents.").
93. The boundaries of the Perkins decision remain unclear. Does Perkins allow undercover
officers to pose as the suspect's defense counsel or as a member of the clergy? See Perkins, 110 S.
Ct. at 2404 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (Perkins presumably allows such ploys). But see
Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 23, Illinois v. Perkins, 110 S. Ct. 2394 (1990) (No. 88-1972)
(the "relatively clear-cut rules governing undercover work" would condemn such ploys). On its
face, Perkins would allow such ploys because the suspect would not realize the purported defense
attorney or clergy member was interrogating him or her. These ploys, however, may be
prohibited by the due process standard which condemns clearly offensive police practices. See
Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954) (holding that confessions initiated by a police psychiatrist,
posing as a physician summoned to relieve the defendant of his painful sinus attack, violated due
process standards).
94. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 449-55 (1966) (quoting passages from manuals
instructing police officers about effective psychological techniques for obtaining confessions).
"The guilt of the subject is to be posited as a fact.... The officers are instructed to minimize the
moral seriousness of the offense ...." Id. at 450 (citing F. INBAU & J. REID, CRIMINAL
INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS (1962)).
95. See Perkins, 110 S. Ct. at 2403 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("The Court's adoption of an
exception to the Miranda doctrine is incompatible with the principle.., that the doctrine should
remain simple and clear.").
96. See id. at 2399 ("We hold that an undercover law enforcement officer.., need not give
Miranda warnings to an incarcerated suspect before asking questions that may elicit an
incriminating response.").
97. Compare Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) with Illinois v. Perkins, 110 S. Ct. 2394
(1990) (holding expressly permits police to omit Miranda warnings) and Rhode Island v. Innis,
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suspect of his or her rights, and the suspect requests counsel, the Per-
kins decision does not prevent police from surreptitiously interrogat-
ing the suspect about an unrelated offense without counsel present.98
Perkins effectively disposes of the procedural safeguards Miranda
erected.
Miranda sought to protect ignorant suspects from their lack of
knowledge.99 As inadequate as the Miranda warnings may be,1° an
advised suspect has the opportunity, provided by knowledge of his or
her constitutional rights, to request further legal assistance. The
warned suspect may also better resist coercive police attempts to
solicit incriminating information. Perkins attacks the heart of
Miranda's protections by allowing police to circumvent the warnings
requirement, and thereby effectively places habitual offenders well-
versed in criminal procedure on better footing than first-time
offenders. 1o
Perkins further limits Miranda by permitting police to covertly
obtain evidence that Miranda would otherwise bar-confessions from
incarcerated suspects who have not received Miranda warnings.
Unlike other undercover operations, undercover interrogations allow
police to accomplish indirectly what would be forbidden if they were
in uniform."2 For example, the usual undercover drug "sting"
446 U.S. 291 (1980) (warnings are required before custodial interrogation-if interrogation does
not occur, then warnings are not required).
98. Perkins indirectly supports the proposition that, like the sixth amendment right to
counsel, the fifth amendment does not prohibit surreptitious attempts to elicit incriminating
information about unrelated offenses. See supra note 70; see also Perkins, 110 S. Ct. at 2399
("[N]o charges had been filed on the subject of the interrogation." (emphasis added)). The
question remains whether the fifth amendment right to counsel is sufficiently analogous to the
sixth amendment right as to prohibit surreptitious interrogations about the same or related
offenses.
99. "For those unaware of the privilege, the warning is needed simply to make them aware of
it-the threshold requirement for an intelligent decision as to its exercise." Miranda, 384 U.S. at
468.
100. Cf 0. STEPHENS, THE SUPREME COURT AND CONFESSIONS OF GUILT 204 (1973)
("Ironically, the police.., were entrusted with implementing the very procedure by which...
compulsion... was supposed to be reduced.... [O]fficers could formally satisfy the Court's
detailed requirements and at the same time retain intact the familiar routine of private
interrogation."); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 505 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("Those who use third-degree
tactics and deny them in court are equally able and destined to lie as skillfully about warnings
and waivers.").
101. But cf Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468-69 ("Assessments of the knowledge the defendant
possessed, based on information as to his [or her] age, education, intelligence, or prior contact
with authorities, can never be more than speculation; a warning is a clearcut fact." (emphasis
added)).
102. But see, Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Massiah, and Miranda: What Is "Interrogation"?
When Does It Matter?, 67 GEO. L.J. 1, 65-69 (1978) (arguing that the government, via an
undercover agent, is "not doing indirectly what Miranda forbids it to do") (emphasis in the
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involves an officer attempting to lure a drug dealer into selling narcot-
ics. Police officers may validly purchase narcotics from, and then
arrest, drug dealers; however, a drug dealer will not likely risk arrest
by selling to an officer dressed in a police uniform. The drug dealer
will more readily engage in a drug transaction with an undercover
agent posing as a fellow drug dealer or similar compatriot in crime.
The conduct of the undercover officer, however, would not be prohib-
ited even if the officer were in uniform.10 3
Surreptitious custodial interrogations, however, differ from other
undercover operations in this regard. Although Perkins permits
undercover agents to interrogate suspects without advising them of
their rights, Miranda would clearly prohibit a uniformed officer from
doing the same. The Perkins result therefore appears manifestly unfair
because it allows the government to accomplish via trickery what the
Constitution otherwise forbids. "
B. Perkins Threatens the Reliability of Confessions
Advocates of Miranda's demise"0 5 may be applauding the Perkins
decision because it undoubtedly provides police an easier mechanism
for obtaining a confession, but whether increased reliance on confes-
sions will affect either conviction rates or the incidence of crime
remains uncertain.10 6  In any event, the utility of a confession is
directly linked to its reliability. An unreliable confession leaves doubt
regarding the defendant's guilt or innocence and thus, serves no socie-
tal purpose.'0 7
original). According to Kamisar, Miranda forbids compulsion, and undercover techniques do
not compel suspects to incriminate themselves.
103. The entrapment doctrine may, however, apply when an undercover agent actively
creates an opportunity for the suspect to commit a crime. For a discussion of the relevant issues,
see Dix, Undercover Investigations and Police Rulemaking, 53 TEX. L. REv. 203 (1975).
104. Cf Illinois v. Perkins, 110 S. Ct. 2394, 2404 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("The
exception carved out of the Miranda doctrine today may well result in a proliferation of
departmental policies to encourage police officers to conduct interrogations of confined suspects
through undercover agents, thereby circumventing the need to administer Miranda warnings.").
105. See, e.g., Ogletree, supra note 20, at 1829-30 ("[T]he Justice Department reportedly is
looking for an appropriate case to urge the Supreme Court to overrule Miranda outright.").
Miranda's opponents commonly complain that Miranda inhibits prosecutors from obtaining
convictions. Eg., Why Crime Keeps Winning, Wall St. J., Dec. 10, 1990, at AI0, col. 1.
106. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 441 n.3 (1966) ("Prosecution procedure has, at
most, only the most remote causal connection with crime. Changes in court decisions and
prosecution procedure would have about the same effect on the crime rate as an aspirin would
have on a tumor of the brain." (quoting David C. Acheson, former Special Assistant to the
Secretary of the Treasury in charge of the Secret Service and the Bureau of Narcotics)).
107. Compare the fifth amendment with the ancient Talmudic rule regarding self-
incrimination. See A. KIRSCHENBAUM, SELF-INCRIMINATION IN JEWISH LAW 17 (1970) ("Not
618
Vol. 66:605, 1991
Self-Incrimination and Undercover Interrogation
The decision not to require Miranda warnings prior to undercover
interrogation threatens the reliability of confessions. Perkins encour-
ages police to employ tactics that reward suspects for inventing past
offenses. In Perkins, Parisi and Charlton offered escape as a reward
for disclosing incriminating information.10s Escape provided an
incentive for Perkins to exaggerate or even fabricate previous criminal
activities." 9 Thus, Perkins exchanges the simple safeguard of articu-
lated warnings for deceptive and manipulative methods of obtaining
confessions that may provide dubious foundations for conviction.
C. Perkins Perpetuates Systemic Bias
Perkins exemplifies the Court's result-oriented approach to defining
Miranda's scope. In Perkins, as in a variety of other cases, the Court
selected a standard that would defeat the defendant's claims.110 In
Innis, for example, the Court developed an objective standard for
interrogation; 1 . however, in Oregon v. Mathiason, I 2 the Court chose
a strict standard for custody." 3 In Perkins, the Court ignored the
only may a man not be compelled to be a witness against himself, but even were he voluntarily to
testify against himself and confess wholly or partially to a crime, his testimony is rejected
completely and has no status in court."). The ancient Talmudic rule reflects a general skepticism
about the reliability of confessions and their overall usefulness in criminal prosecution.
108. Parisi and Charlton clearly wanted Perkins to repeat verbatim the testimony given by
Charlton to Illinois police. For one hour before entering Perkins' cellblock, Parisi reviewed
transcripts of Charlton's testimony concerning conversations between Charlton and Perkins
while both were incarcerated at Graham. See Proceedings at 38, 54, People v. Perkins (Ill. Cir.
Ct., 20th Cir., Feb. 18, 1987) (No. 86-CF-305) (Report of Proceedings on Motion to Suppress
available in Joint Appendix, Illinois v. Perkins, 110 S. Ct. 2394 (1990) (No. 88-1972)). Parisi and
Charlton then led Perkins through a maze of fact-specific questions regarding, for example, the
method of distinguishing the victim's house from the others in the neighborhood, the type of
garage door, and the size of the shells used to shoot the victim. Id. at 46-48.
109. Justice Marshall aptly noted in his Perkins dissent that "where the suspect is
incarcerated, the constant threat of physical danger peculiar to the prison environment may
make him demonstrate his toughness to other inmates by recounting or inventing past violent
acts." Illinois v. Perkins, 110 S. Ct. 2394, 2403 (1990).
110. In reviewing the cases, the Court does not consistently choose between subjective,
objective, and strict standards. A subjective test evaluates the circumstances as either the suspect
or the interrogator perceived them. An objective standard views the circumstances from the
perspective of a "reasonable" person. On the other hand, a strict standard operates without
regard to the views of any persons involved. Thus, neither the prosecution nor a criminal
defendant can predict which standard the Court will apply.
111. See supra note 40 (interrogation consists of words or actions police know or should know
are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response). The Innis Court, however, subjectively
applied its seemingly objective standard. Instead of asking whether reasonable officers would
have predicted the defendant's response, the Court concluded that the particular officers did not
subjectively know that the defendant would incriminate himself. See id.
112. 429 U.S. 492 (1977).
113. The defendant in Mathiason was interrogated by a uniformed officer at a police station.
Id. at 493. The Court nevertheless concluded that the defendant was not in custody because he
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conclusion based on objective standards that police interrogated the
defendant while he was in custody. The Perkins Court instead created
a second subjective requirement that coercion be "determined from
the perspective of the suspect." ' 4 This result-oriented method for
choosing standards manifests a systemic bias against criminal
defendants. 1
1 5
V. UNDERCOVER INTERROGATIONS SHOULD BE
PROHIBITED
The Perkins Court should not have created the undercover excep-
tion to Miranda. Contrary to the assumptions of the Perkins Court,
undercover techniques actually heighten, rather than dispel, the com-
pulsion inherent in custodial interrogations."t 6  Thus, Miranda dic-
tates that warnings precede surreptitious interrogations of
incarcerated suspects. Undercover agents, however, are unlikely to
administer Miranda warnings because to do so would reveal that the
agents are enforcement officials and defeat the purpose of the covert
operation. Requiring Miranda warnings would therefore effectively
was not under formal arrest, and the defendant was therefore not entitled to receive Miranda
warnings. Id. at 495. But see id. at 500 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (defendant was a parolee and
"technically in legal custody continuously until his sentence [had] been served"). Under either
an objective or a subjective standard, the defendant in Mathiason was in custody. A reasonable
person interrogated by an officer at a police station would believe he or she was in custody. And
in Mathiason, the defendant probably inferred that he was in custody. The Court, however,
chose the one standard for custody that defeated the defendant's claims.
114. Illinois v. Perkins, 110 S. Ct. 2394, 2397 (1990). The Perkins subjective requirement is
flawed because it does not actually view coercion from the defendant's perspective. Instead, the
Perkins Court imputed its views to the defendant and determined that the defendant could not
have felt compelled. A defendant, however, may have subjectively felt compelled even if the
Court later concludes that the defendant's belief was erroneous. See W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL,
supra note 16, at 491.
115. The Court has also developed an "expectation of privacy" test predisposed to defeat a
defendant's claim that a warrantless search by police violated the fourth amendment. See
generally California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988); U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of
the people to be secure ... against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated
...."). By interjecting its views on what is reasonable, the Court has denied fourth amendment
protection to defendants who possessed genuine expectations of privacy. E.g., Florida v. Riley,
109 S. Ct. 693 (1989) (holding that a helicopter flying at 400 feet was not rare enough to justify
the defendant's expectation that the contents of his greenhouse would not be observed through
the small opening in the roof); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988) (holding
unreasonable the defendant's expectation that the contents of his sealed garbage bags would
remain private); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986) (reversing the California Supreme
Court's finding that the defendant manifested a reasonable expectation that his yard, enclosed by
a six-foot high outer fence and a ten-foot inner fence, would not be observed by an airplane flying
at an altitude of 1000 feet). The Court has used its own expectations to increasingly narrow the
domain over which individuals can claim privacy.
116. See supra notes 88-94 and accompanying text.
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preclude the gathering of evidence through surreptitious custodial
interrogations.
Because Perkins held that Miranda does not apply to covert custo-
dial interrogations, lower courts must now examine the content of
each undercover interrogation to determine whether the suspect was
compelled on either coerced confession or due process grounds.
1 17
Under Perkins, lower courts are more likely to admit unreliable con-
fessions solicited by undercover agents who promise suspects a
reward.11 Thus, although police may have legitimate reasons for
planting undercover agents in jails and prisons, 119 the prospect that
lower courts may routinely uphold coercive undercover tactics neces-
sitates the adoption of a per se rule prohibiting surreptitious custodial
interrogations.12 The risk of compulsion associated with undercover
interrogations requires that police find alternative means of obtaining
the evidence required for a conviction. 121
Commentators who criticize the Supreme Court's continued depar-
ture from Miranda 122 often advocate new or different per se rules.123
117. See supra note 32; supra text accompanying notes 16-19. On remand, the Illinois trial
court should determine whether the undercover escape ploy used by Illinois police violated the
coerced confession doctrine. See Perkins, 110 S. Ct. at 2400-01 (Brennan, J., concurring)
(discussed supra note 64); see also Arizona v. Fulminante, 59 U.S.L.W. 4235 (U.S. Mar. 26,
1991) (defendant was coerced when a paid government informant offered him protection from
the violent treatment of fellow inmates in exchange for his confession). In Fulminante, the Court
held that harmless error analysis applies to coerced confessions, but that Fulminante was entitled
to a new trial because the admission of his confession was not harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. Id. at 4239, 4241.
118. Lower courts may infer that the Court tacitly accepted the validity of the escape ploy
used in Perkins, see 110 S. Ct. at 2397 ("[p]loys to mislead a suspect ... that do not rise to the
level of compulsion"), and conclude that similar tactics, not rising to the level of physical abuse
or threats, do not constitute compulsion.
119. See id. at 2399 ("The use of undercover agents is a recognized 1kw enforcement
technique, often employed in the prison context to detect violence against correctional officials or
inmates .... ").
120. Cf. White, supra note 90, at 603 ("A practice that makes the suspect unaware that the
police are interrogating him, and therefore... [unaware that] he should have counsel present,
clearly creates an unacceptable risk of infringement of the suspect's constitutional rights.
[Undercover] interrogation technique[s] ... should be the subject of a per se prohibition.").
121. The Court has previously recognized the need to prohibit police activity when
constitutional rights might be too easily abridged. See Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 180
(1985) ("To allow the admission of evidence obtained from the accused in violation of his [s]ixth
[a]mendment rights whenever the police assert an alternative, legitimate reason for their
surveillance invites abuse by law enforcement personnel in the form of fabricated investigations
and risks the evisceration of the [s]ixth [a]mendment .... ").
122. Cf Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 26, at 98 (the Court's message "has been given
clearly and repeatedly: Miranda hinders effective law enforcement and will be disregarded
whenever possible").
123. See id. at 75 (proposing as a new per se rule that "out-of-court statements made by
defendants while in custody, whether or not the result of interrogation, cannot be used to
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These proposed rules would more stringently limit the use of confes-
sions and the means of obtaining them. The continued proposal by
commentators of per se rules suggests that clear distinctions offer
pragmatic and attractive benefits.' 24 Per se rules operate without
regard to either the defendant's or the interrogator's subjective view,
and therefore provide a means of separating admissible from inadmis-
sible confessions that is less susceptible to manipulation.
VI. CONCLUSION
Perkins imprudently carves out an exception to Miranda's per se
rule requiring that custodial interrogations be preceded by warnings.
Perkins fails to uphold the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination by allowing police to use covert tactics that may compel
a suspect to confess. A more appropriate application of Miranda
would exclude from evidence incriminating statements obtained dur-
ing undercover custodial interrogations not preceded by warnings.
Surreptitious custodial interrogations are inherently compelling and
should be prohibited per se.
Kathryn Young-sook Kim
establish guilt in criminal trials"); Ogletree, supra note 20, at 1842 ("All suspects in custody
should have a nonwaivable right to consult with a lawyer before being interrogated by the police.
Any statements obtained by police before a suspect consults her attorney would automatically be
inadmissible as evidence."). Professor Ogletree's proposed rule would not prevent police from
covertly interrogating suspects while they are in jail because a suspect's attorney cannot
practically be present continuously throughout the suspect's incarceration.
124. See Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 26, at 94 ("Miranda ...[has] at least one
virtue-the ruling created a bright line .. . . [T]here is a virtue in having a rule of criminal
procedure that is well known and readily understood ...."); White, supra note 90, at 599 ("Per
se rules ... provide better guidance for the police and increased protection for suspects.").
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